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Introduction 
I don'c know ifI can describe it, bur I know it when I feel ir. Just one night, everybody can feel 
what each other is chinking and everything. You breathe together, you swell together, you just 
do everything together. and a different aura comes over the room. 
!Trombonist J,Jelba Liston in Berline1; 1994, p. 3 92) 
DALLEY: I only felt that we were corning close w the essence of vvhat Beethoven had in. mind 
when he vvTOte the piece: that kind of hymnlike obeisance to a higher povver .... I felt that all 
of us shared the same sense of something special taking place. 
SOYER: Of course. by its very narure such a movement demands that we hav-e a completely 
homogenous sound. Bur as John says, it's somerimes more than our attempt to make it so: every-
thing becomes concerted and blended and propelled as if by itseif. The music seems w take over. 
(Violinist John Dalley and Cellist David Sayer in Blum, 1986, p. 169) 
It's sort of stumbling imo this area where there's a lot of energy and something happening and 
noc a lot of conrroL So that the sense of individual control disappears and you are working at 
another level emirely. Sometimes this feels to me as chough you don't really have to think about 
what's happening. Things just fl.o\v: 
(Guitarist jerry Garcia in Bailey, 1992, pp. 42-43) 
These sratemems from jazz, classical, and rock musicians are representative of a fairly rare but very dis-
tinctive and treasured experience that can sometimes occur in ensemble musical per±ormance. l\tlusicians 
report a sense of imense absorption, as if they are connected ro each other and the music in an especially 
immediate manner. The question of this chapter is: How should we make sense of these e21.""Periences? 
. In a recent article, Schiavio and H0ffding (2015) argue that such intense musical experiences help 
Justify a radical enactivist view of the filind. According w this view, a great deal of mental process-
ing does not require internal representational states (i.e., brain-based structures that both point t0 
and stand in fur objects in the external world). Instead, musical understanding may be constimted by 
lnteraccions becween the individual and the musical activicy. Thus: 
Pertectly coordinated musical interaction is possible ;,vithom ail.y conscious perception of 
others, and it seems to us that the only way w make sense of this is by appeal to a fundamen-
tal bodily-based reciprocity or imeraction thac bvpasses most levels of high-level cognition 
(Schiavio and Heff.-tiing, 2015, p. 16) 
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Schiavio and H0ffding's argument seems to be that because the group's performance relies so heavily 
on spontaneous behavioral imeranions, and because the musicians tend nm to repon classic represen-
rntional states like memal imagery or inner speech, this is good evidence that such representations are 
not a necessary feature of meaningful cognitive activity 
However, rhe common compiaint about embodied -views of the mind is that it is perfectly coher-
ent to emphasize the causal dependence of certain mental processes on behavioral imeractions ·\<.chile 
maintaining that the immediate realizers of conscious experiences are brain-based representations. 
Moreover, Schiavio and H0ffding do not. in my view, sufficiently recognize how sophisticated musical 
understanding must be in order for a musician to parse musically significant foarures and to respond 
appropriately to such features. "AJl parties agree that musical ii.""lteraction is hardly a simple matter of 
stimulus-response. On the contrar;1~ it displays an extraordinary degree of flexibility in response to 
nrious high-level features of sound. Responding flexibly then seems to derr1and that one choose 
among options, but it does not seem possible for multiple options to be considered unless they are 
represented in some form (as non-actual but possib1e). l\1eanwhile, an advantage of represemationalist 
views of the mind is chat representations share a common computational form that allows for abstract 
recombination and inference processes to guide such sophisticated actions. 
In comrast to Schiavio and H0ffding, 1 believe that the best \vay ro make sense of the musician's 
reports is by appeal to a representationalist account of "group flow" (cf Hart & Di Blasi, 2015; Saw-
yer. 2006). Group flow is structurally analogous to individual flo\\', as described by Csikszentmi1Ulyi 
(1990). Thus, I will hypothesize a process by \Vhich flow occurs, com...'llon to both individual and 
collective cases, in which the usual sense of wismatch bev.:veen intentions and performance is lost. 
Since the interaction between intentions and performai""lce is basically the interaction bet\'V-een nvo 
represemational states, t:b.is vvill contradict the enactivist approach. So, if my account is able w e:..-plain 
the musician's repons, this rather undermines support for ai""l enactivist interpretation. At the same 
time, I ""ill argue that spontaneous imeractions vvith the overall musical product play a vital role in 
generating w.1-ie content of each musician's intentions. In this sense, group flow does involve a genu-
inely collective cognitive task. However, the coment-generacing cognitive task is not the same thii.""lg 
as the mental state that results from this task (i.e., the feeling of being absorbed in the music; cf. the 
approach I develop in Cochrane, 2009). 
Individual Flow in Music 
The phenomenon of fimv was brought to vvidespread academic attention with the publication 
of Mihaly Csikszem:mi.h.al;,i's 1990 book. Flow: The Psychology cf Optimal E..Yperience (which draws 
rogether research going back w -che It has come w be e2>.-plicitly defined with the following 
nine charanerisrics (slightly re-ordered here from Csikszemmihaly, 1990: Jackson & Marsh, 1996): 
_ 1aic>n-awareness merrina: A lack of awareness of self as senarate fron1 the actions being uerforrned ~ o r ~• 
2. Loss of se£f-consciousness: Concen-::. for che self disappears and ;:he person becomes one vvith the 
acnv1r·v 
,., _4 sense l~f conrrol: f~ sense of exercisi11g control \iVithour actually Iry-ing to be in control 
..1 Tt·an~tOrrnar:ion q_f tilne: .LI:\. loss of time a\'i\rareness or riine disorienration 
-, _:4utorelic experience: """.\11 intrinsically re\varding experience involving a deep sense of enjoy111cJ1L 
, C , I . , .i N , . - - ;i ' . .- . -· . ,.i 6. oncentrarzon on t 1e rask ar ha nu: 1 ; arro\v1ng or toe us anu i:ne center111g ot attennon on a 1.11111Le.u 
.S. 
stllnuius field 
Clear ._'?oais: Goals eit:hcr set in ad,,,-ance or de\.reloped out of i1T\;-olven1ent in the activiry· are clearly 
defined 
Clear and i1r_u11ediare feedback concerning pe:rfor111ance in relation re rhe 
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9. Challe11ge-skil/ balance: The requirement that there be a balance between ability and the demands 
of the task 
I regard the first five of these conditions w be descriptive statements about vvhat it's like to e:x-perience 
flovv. The next four then read to me as generative conditions for flov\: Condition six notably has bmh 
generative and descriptive aspects, since attention is partly voluntary bur at the same rime difficult to 
totally focus on a given task. MeaIT1.cvli..ile, condition nine, regarding the balancing of skill and demand, 
seems to best e ... -plain hm"· attention can be so folly captured. Consider, if the difficulty of the task 
exceeds the individual's capacity to perform it, then the individual's attention vvl.11 be drawn to his or 
her ovvn actions for the sake of error discerrunent and correction. On the other hand, if the individual's 
ability far exceeds the demands of the task, a strong focus of attention is no longer required for successful 
performance, and his or her attention is likely to wander. Thus, attentional capture should be optimally 
achieved when the L'l.dividual is only just capable of successfully performing the ;:ask. In this condition, 
the individual's ex-perience can. be focused on the unimpeded continuation-the flovF--of L.~e acti-viry: 
While the balance between skill and demand can explain anention capmre, it does not seem rn me 
that either this or the other generative conditions can plausibly e:x-plain the sense of action-awareness 
merging, the loss of self-consciousness, or the sense of effortless control. In order ro ex-plain these 
feamres. I think we should say more about the relationship between intentions and performance. This 
relationship is capmred in the (very) simplified schema (neutrally covering bmh scored and impro-
vised music) in Figure 14.1. 
Each of ;:he stages depicted in Figure 14.1 represents the output of a fairly complex cognitive pro-
cess. First, the musical intention is the accumulation of a number of factors, i11cluding the performer's 
understandL.'1g of the music as developed over the course of rehearsal, her aesthetic goals, and perhaps 
personal or social goals for the performance. In the diagram I have highlighted that a key psychologi-
cal feature of the musician's intention is a "map of saliencies" (which I adapt from Keller, 2008). That 
is, as the musicians rehearse, she develops a mental schema or script of >.vhat features she needs to pay 
particular anemion to in order to ensure successful performance. This can include particular notes, 
rhythms, fmgering rechniques, e:x-pressive features, or tirnbral effects. 
Second, the musical peiformance is the combination of how the music sounds w rhe musician and 
her awareness of wider comextual details, such as the reaction of the audience or hmv her body feels. 
How the music sounds to the musicians is of course U. . formed by her sophisticated capaciry to parse 
Musical intention 







Corrective musical action 
Musicai performance 
{heard and anticipated) 
i 
~ =activates 
---t- = inhibits 
perforrnancc is noc D.n.1iccd :o :i-:c presen.c 1:r1onier;.c. The n1usiciail LnoniLors che O'le::.-all progress of 
~he n1usic. She also receives erierenc feedback fron1 her bodily accions i:har co son1e cxrcnr allo\VS her 
:o anticipar:e ho\v che n1.usic :s goi:ug t:o sound prior co processing chc audiror:-T signaL 
Third .. correcrh,,e Hiusical ~1ctiori . :ar.i. be undcrsrood as chc produc;:: of regisrerh"1g the rrismcttch bet>Neen 
che music chat is L.J.tended Lld :he n1usic chac is in tact ?roducec! .. Irrcenxions directly scin1ularc action, 
buc che 1nusician n1ust: ,:onscandy ddjusc dnd cor:ecr chis action as it proceeds. So if rh.e musician hits 1 
\Vrong noce. uses incorrecc fingering~ or produces an inconsistent c:-cpressi~1-e etiect:~ she "\:v-ill recognizes 
c-h1s as error. The recognition of errors will stimulace corrective actions chat may involve repeating 
che miscakcn passage or adjuscing chc mar ...11er of pertOrmance as che music conti1Tues. In chis 1,vay~ a 
key teat:ure or- musical action can be construed as a control loop in w-h.ich che goal of the acr.:iviry is 
co reduce che mi.smacch bct'Neen che music chat is intended and ~he music that is ir1 fact: produced (or 
jusc about: to be produced'L The reduction 0f wisn1atch is depicted by i:he diai.llond-headed arro\v in 
Figu.re 1-k 1 ('iNhere regu.lar arro,;vs indicate che causal generacion or- che nexr stage). 
i\part from performance correction. anocher major Eeamre of regulating mismacch bec-,veen imen-
cion and performance is to form micable intentions chat can in fan be sacisfied. This requires a degree 
of deference coward realiry: For insca...'1.ce. musicians are to some exrenc relianc on che capacities of their 
insrrumem and the acoustic properries of the room. They must accordingly defer various aspects of 
their musical incencions w <:hese reatures. Thus, the dotted line in the diagram is to indicate chat the 
musicians may also updai:e her musical imencions w reflect such realities. Furthermore. the way the 
performance is going may present unanticipated opportunities for enb.ancemem. Differem styles of 
music present different degrees of latitude in chis regard. However, even classical musicians do not 
simply stick co rigid plans, bllt cypically react co che live possibilicies chat seem co be available (cf 
Scl1iavio & H0ffding, 2015). For example, if some unanticipaced expressive effect is achieved, c-he mis-
match may be regulated by updacing one's expressive iI1tentions so as to sustain or develop che novel 
expressive rrajectory. Sirrillarly. in improvised. jazz. musicians may smomh over che error of hitcing an 
unanticipated pitch by deliberately incorporating chat pitch into their cominuing performance. 
So far, we have a schematic picture of the basic cognitive tasks ii.-i.voh-ed in performing music. This 
schema is admitcedly si..'Tipiified, but it has uciliry in helping us underscaI1d a major aspect of the eA.'Pe-
rience of perforrni.rig music. To explain: at least some of che musician's eA.rperience vvii.l be focused 
on appreciating the sound chac is bei..71g produced. However, a very significant J.i.'1d perhaps dominant 
aspect of the e:\.'Perience vvill be characterized by the experience of the mismatch between incemion 
and produce. Nloreover, che sense of mismacch vvii.l have three results, 'Nhich tend co undermine fl.ovv: 
Firsr, che musicians vvii.l experience the effort of correccive action. proportional co the degree of 111is-
macch represemed. This direet:s :he musician's attemion coward her bodily actions and chus underrrillies 
action-awareness mergii.'1g. Second, the musician may actend more closely ~o her intencion, because the 
way co correct error often involves clarifying for oneselfhovv che music is supposed co sound and how 
the action is supposed to be brought about. This vvill undenr.ine the loss of self-consciousness. 
Third, I mentioned previously chat musicians also get efferent feedback on the bodily actions they 
perform when calculating their overall representation of che music. A related consequence of che 
processing of mismacch is an amicipation of how easily che musician will be able co compensate for 
mismatch. This is what appraisal theories of emocions call "coping pocential" (e.g., Scherer, 2005). h 
is an important source of whatever confidence or stress musicians may feel wJ:ille perforrriing. Noce 
in particular chat both confidence and stress are sources of self-consciousness: one is self-promoring 
vvhile the ocher is self-aversive. 
Overall, a major factor a musician's eC>.rpenence during perforrnance IS a sense of tension berv:een 
how the music sounds and how she wanes ic co sound. However, if the musician succeeds in marching 
intention with performance, the sense of mismatch or error -,-vill disappear, and with iL che sense of effort 
and pocencially also the sense of coping potencial. Tris chereby removes a signifi.cam source of reflective 
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-;~Lf-cansciousncss l:Ld hc11;s c~~ptai11 ::::he heighcencC. cask :oc"US LI1 :he exnerience 0£ tlovv~ :vtoreover. if 
- ,~ ,...,...,.,-,_-;....,..;>.s "'"'..:s.rr-:.-..~~ ...,an-,..:>. -h -.., ,..i-, - .-~ - ... 1"1;::- .. 1 · - _._- ·11 ' ' irl[t"I1Gl1L:. l..:..:.c~i.'-.1...i\... }-''-L-vt!li. -l.· ....... L.1.. ... e1 ... ,,,..:.1eOr.;'"'1Cc1..L.1 t...:.1C repreSCl1ta.Cl0tl 0[ pC;,,J_Or!nance -1,,VL.l :JCC!Hae Or 
_..,T11outlag:e che incencion. That: is. i.E che n-iusic::ll incencion lac~G reau.Ires char d.istingt1ish it fro1n chc 
l."""J,. .... '-
represencacion ot- per~Or1n'1.l."'1CC. chis undeolines the cap,1cicy 0f t:he musician i:o disrj_""l±.Ctiriely e3..J?erience 
chac incencion. Nace chaL che li1tcnci.on does not disappear here. If chere ;.vas no incention. perrOrrr1ance 
\vould noc be generat:ed ax all. Ra.cher. occlusion should lead co r:hc illusion of disappearance. 
\;\/id.1 r.:he loss or- various sourc>es of self-in"lolving coni.:e!1c_ rhe musician·s attentional resources 
should be quite dran1aticaily freed up co acrend co che rr1ore incrinsic values of d1e r:nusic. This helps 
' h 1 · - ~ ...:J . - 1 - 1 • '"'1 - ·- ' ' 
cxpla1n c .. le autoccuc nacure ot t:he uo·'.v experience. >Jore. hO\ve·ver. thac tne skll1-chailenge balance 
muse be maintained. If skill cxceeci.s che dema11ds of perfOrmance~ rhe musician 1;vill probabl""Y- rOrn1 
n1ore ambirious intentions for i:he music chat allo\.:v- niismacch zo reappear. In contrast, rto"v experi-
' ~ 1 . l . 1. ,- 1 • 
ences -cena co oe caugnc up :n cne more lill.J.liewa:ce noLe-t:o-note momenrurr ... or cne p1ece. 
Flow in Ensemble Performance 
Having characterized che psychological processes by •xl:>ich the flow experience may be generared 
in indiv"idual performance, my goal is now co show thac a sL.rnilar process ca..-i occur in ensembie 
performance. Ensemble performance nacurally presems certain additional comple::cixies char must be 
accommodated. In particular, we must higblighc che differem roles of musical leadership and musi-
cal follo,,,ing. Note rhat these roles are rarely so dearly an:ribmable to differem individuals in real 
ensemble pertormance (see, e.g., Goebl & Palmer, 2009). I characterize these roles separately for the 
sake of clarifying the key psychological demem:s or- ensemble periormance. 
For aay activity. leadership involves tl:iree essemial characteristics: (1) the leader makes a decision: 
(2) chis decision is corlli--nunicaced co rhe :s~oup; and (3) the group defers w the leader in conforming 
m chis decision. These characteristics maintain che coher.ence or unicy of the group's activities. 
We can see chat che basic functions of the leader can be fitted imo our earlier schema for musi-
cal perrormance. The leader's decision maps omo che intention node, which she compares wid:i a 
represem:ation of the overall musical ompuc. The leader recognizes a wismatch between her incen-
tion and che group's performance, which results in a communicative gesrnre co the performers 
(either an explicit instruction or a more evaluative form of feedback such as a scowl or nod). w71iat 
may seem more complex than the earlier individual case is chat, from the perspective of the leader, 
musical action can no;,v be construed as che combination of che leader's communicative gesmre 
and rhe performer's deference to the leader's instruction. Accordingly, where a leader detects error 
or mismatch, she may identify either a failure to communicate effectively or a failure in performer 
deference. However, chis additional complexity actually has an analogue in the individual case. 
Recall chat one of the ways musicians may react co error is by clarifying their performance inten-
tions. So even at the individual leveL musical anion can involve not just correccing behavior bm 
ensuring that intention is effectively guiding behavior. The clarification of imemion in response m 
wismacch is analogous to the correction of the leader's communicative gescures. 
In rhe same way, it is completely compatible vvith che conditions for B.mv that conducrors experi-
ence fio1,v when cheir sense of mismatch between intention and musical sound disappears. When this 
happens it may well seem to che conductor as if his or her gestures are immediately producir1g che 
music. This still coums as a case of individual B.ovv, but it moves us somewhat closer to the group fl.ow 
case because the conducmrs cake themselves to be shaping che overall musical outpm produced by 
many musicians simultaneously. 
For instance. rhe follo,ving report by conductor Leonard Bernstein sounds iike a case of Bo>N to me: 
When it happens in conducting, it happens because you idemif; so completely with the 
composer. you "ve studied him so intemiy, rhat it's as though you've wrirten the piece yourself. 
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righc :here. 
~usr n'lake it '.lP as though you ne)ier heard ic 'oe:Orc. Because you be-.:-on1e :hat: :on1poser~ 
kilO\:'\i \\rhen such a ching has happened because ic :akcs :ne so long co ::on1c back. 
Ic =:dkes four or rlve nllnutes co k.i.1ovv \vhar rI.n in. \Vt.a t0.c orchcst:ra is. 'N-hO are t:he 
people :;.11aking ill c!J.ac noise bel1ind me, \/\.rho arr1 I? It's a very greaL e~Tericn..:e and ic doesn·c 
happen orten enougti. 
/Bern::rcein in Epsrein: 1987, /). 52J 
Scrong rOcus on ;:he cocai r!1usical product ·\vill be an hTpor~anc tearure or group tlo~;v: Of course. the 
conductor's actual capacicy co shape the overall musical product is quir:e limiced~ and this may increase 
opporcunities for rrismacch. Yet recall char mismatch cau also be :educed by adjusting one's imemion co 
ber.::er fit realicy·, or co be more responsi•.te to :he live possibilicies of che rnomenc L1 general, rrtlsn1acch 
calculations should be cailored co a level of regulation thar is 1,\rirhin che musician's means. 
Let us IlO\V curn rro111 che leaders point: of vie\V to the follO\Ver's poinc of vie~;v: Here che deference 
of intentions becomes particularly marked . .01Iusicians playing a tOllovver role can. quite radically d.ra\v 
their musical imemions from the leader's instructions. Even :he sense of mismatch may be partially 
handed over co che scowls of a conductor. Of course, such cases of scrong deference rely on the musi-
cians interpreting the meaning of the leader's insrructions, so the followers have hardly bypassed :heir 
o•;vn representational staces. However. from the perspective of conscious experience, the followers 
experience the leader's iustructions as ii.J.distinguishable from their own intentions; such is the auto-
matic narure of endorsing che leader's ir.structions in many cases. 
wre are now in a posirion co characterize group fl.01,v. wrhat: is required is chac aspects of both a 
leader's and fullower's perspective are incorporated. This is not uncornrnon in ensemble performance. 
For exa..'tlple, i..r1 a srring quartet or jazz ensemble, any of the musicians may be called upon at di£ferent 
times to take on different roles in the maintenance of musical coherence. A<: some points they may 
need co take a leadership role by darifying the pulse or striki.'"lg om vvith a certain expressi,;e idea, 
and at other ooims thev must defer to such leadershiu activities in the others. Particularlv where the 
.l. ~ .J... • 
ensemble emphasizes ::he spontaneous adaptation co live possibilities, individual musicians must be 
constantly ready to ;:ake on either role (indeed, No-y: Dekel, & Alon, 2011 also present evidence that 
irnpro1,ised inreractions are smoother in the absence of strict hierarchical roles). 
In being ready to rake a leadership role, the ii.J.dividual's sense of responsibility for the entire musi-
cal product is ma..'Cirrized. And from this poim of view, there is a significandy greacer opporrunity 
for experiencing rrismacch. The musicians form not just an intention regarding their own individual 
:::omribution. They also de,;elop a sense of how the overall musical product is supposed to sound as 
well as che intentions of other musicians as ~hey cake on leadersr.tip roles. Thus, ;:;he individuai's imen-
cion can rriismatch the individual music product, the group musical product, and the ocher musicians' 
intentions. They may also be a\"Vare from a follower's point of view of how the L.ritemions of others 
mismatch the result. 
How mighc group tlow be achieved in such apparently inhospitable conditions? First, it looks like 
the musicians must at least be confident enough in their individual comributions nm to be distracted 
by mistakes on that front. This should free up cheir attencion co concentrate on the other musicians 
and the overall musical product. Reports of ii.J.tense imerpersonal connection suggest that group rlow 
involves the loss of mismatch becween one's 01,vn intentions and those of other musicians. However, it 
is by cussling over the character of the overall musical product chat one most deariy experiences the 
distinct intentions of others, so I suggest chat rhe crucial condition for generating group B.ov;,,- can be 
reasonably simplified to a loss of mismatch bet'Neen one's imemions and the overall musical producr. 
Hence. che challenge of achieving group Bow is co form imentions for che overall musical product 
and for chose imern:ions co be completely satisfied, even chough one has relatively litde comrol over 
hmv the overall music progresses. 
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Tl1is ,_:halleng~ is best ITlCt 0""l radical co che overall rnusicil \Xi~e have 
>-.;"·iniined ho\~,;" n1usi1.:iar1s nla~l ·~~crer chcir incentions co che conducror. Here d ::.:Urther seen is :aken. 
1.,..~"\-L -
yhc n1usicians 1.-irJ.\'-·- irrcencions noc ri·orn. a leader'5 instruction buc fro111 chcir sense O[- :he mon1cr:cur::. 
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caneous 1c1Jusa11ent 1s - che conc-hcions for opciiual en.sen1ble perrOr:nance identi:fied in Blum. 
t 986 and W""adding'Corr. 20 Sponcaneous adjusm1enc n1akes it much harder co distincdv an:end 
co ho\V rnusic is supposed i::o sou11d. in conrr:ist to ho\v it: does sound or ho\v"" ic's abour co sound. 
. 1 1 • 1 1 ~ 1 •'"[ .J 1 1 11 ,- 1 ~ 1 . • - 1~ Sponcane:i:y dlSO maKes 1c naraer ror sKlll to ~xceecl. tne cca enges O[ t:ne cask. s;ius capturing che rull 
auencion or- che per±Ormers~ 
In reference co chis, it is \Vorrh nocing chat Hart: and Di Blasi 13) clairn ::hat: because sponcane-
ous ense1nble pertOrn1ance lacks :.:lear goals and feedback. group flo\.v does nae display all r.ine of rhe 
characceriscics defi.nicive of individual tlo'vv. Yet: i:hese authors seerr1 coo caughc up \\.'lth verbalized goals 
and feedback. Improvising cnsen1ble musicians have an im111ediare goal co maini.:ain che intrinsically 
re1.varding charact:eristics of the music~ and feedback is irrill1ediate i11 perceiving che error or success in 
acl:.ieving chis. Thus. rhere is a complete paralld m individual tlmv. 
Overall, I have suggested chac group fi.mv- is essentially an experience in which the individual does 
noc experience a mismacch berween what she is imending and what the others are intending by means 
of radically deferring her intentions co che overall musical produce This happens when che musician 
is highly responsive w the possibilities of the moment and is not distracted by performance errors. 
This is vvhat makes best sense of musicians' reports chac the music it:self seew..s m be taking over. As 
iiJ. standard accoums of fi.nw, this should also be something chat the individual musician is only just 
capable of doing. Indeed. it is quite feasible chat responding spontaneously to che corrscamly changing 
nuances of the weal musical product deman.ds one's full arremional resources. 
Embodied Musical Cognition 
The final question we should have about this accoum of group flow is che extem to which ic coums 
as a case of embodied cogrition. The reader will note that I described how an individual may experi-
ence a sense of group· flovv. Thus. I have noc suggested chat a single conscious e::,,-perience is literally 
distribuced across several people. Indeed. if the i11dividual musicians come to e:s,.-perience no distinction 
bet<;veerr their imem:ion and the intention: of Others, ic \VOuld be fair tO say that group aow is a kind 
of illusion st'uuulated bv :he loss of mismai:ch. l'vlismatch is how vYe track rhe distinction benveen seif 
and realicy, or between self and ochers (cf. Law~'1i &: Silani. 201 +). Loss of mismatch onlv emails rhac 
che awareness of distinction is lost. noc chat there is in fact no such distinction. 
However, ic does seem fair to say chac chere is a genuinely group-level phenomenon to be found 
in group B.ow. Not only is it quite possible for multiple musicians to simulraneously defer co the cotal 
musical product, but it is conducive to the individual's experience of group Bow that ever/one does 
so. Strong reciprocity ;,vithin che group allows rhe musiciaiJ.s' comriburions co significantly infi.uence 
the overall musical output, and thereby support their sense of match bet"Yveen intention and outcome. 
I'vloreover, it is ;,vhen everybody seems m simultaneously adjust or change direction that one feels 
caught up in the flow-as if the music is taking over. 
]\/lore than this, I suggest chat in responding to ;:he live possibilities of the emire musical outpm, 
the musicians' formation of their imentions becomes a cognfrively distributed task. To explain: The 
individual's sense of how the music is supposed to sound is novv largely decermined by how she 
understands the actual progress of the music. but the acmal progress of che music is fixed noc just by 
the individual's comribution but by all of :he musicians simultaneously. Thus. che in&vi.dual's imen-
cion is fixed by the comribmions of many musicians. 
Irr effecc, each musician's stace of mind is something like "I imend that" where that is the actual 
musical sound, and so foced by something external to the musicia..'1.'s brain. Of course. ;,vhat "that" is 
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undcrscandlng here .Joes noc Ul.!.dernnne d:le dererence in conce;:;.t. To make an analogy~ che 
pe:--cepticn of a cree <:iepends on one's possession of :he cree concepc. but che specirlc concenc of che per-
cepcual state derers co \vhac i:he actual rree is like. Unli.1<c in1aginacive staces~ iI1 perceptual states t:he 
thing i11 chc ~~iorld supports and sustains the e~-perience: it fi.xes ics cor-cenc So sinlliarly in die case 
0£ dete:-red inrencions~ che external objecL ri...-xes che contenr: of i:he inrenrion-and can n1oreover do 
dlis tOr se·1eral peop~e simulraneously: Bux unlike ;:he perccpcion or- che cree~ che tnusicians are actively 
tOrnllng chac content. Thus. it is fair co say chat che musicians~ cognfrive task of tOrming intentions is 
literally· sl1ared sll1ce rhey all rely on each other to tL-x ..:he factu.al musical product:~ and chereby co tL'C 
the content of each of cheir imemions. 
Conclusion 
have described how che matching of imemions and performance can help explain che radical loss of 
self-consciousness and sense of action-awareness rz1ergii.'lg thac characterizes experiences or .. tlow. This 
model has largely -;vorked \vich a represemacionalisc model of mind (or at least conscious experience) 
but has gone beyond imernal computational represemacions in_ supposing chere to be a cogrijtive cask 
distribmed \v-ith the physical group imeractious. Thus. chere is a sense in which ic is trne ;;hac che 
music can cake over, or speak through you. 
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